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Over the past decade, there has been
increasing scientific interest in anoma-
lous experiences. These can be defined
as “uncommon experience[s] [. . . ] that,
although [they] may be experienced by
a significant number of persons [. . . ],
[are] believed to deviate from ordinary
experience or from the usually accepted
explanation of reality according toWestern
mainstream science” (Cardeña et al.,
2014). This scientific interest has led
to important contributions toward the
understanding of several aspects of these
experiences (Brugger and Mohr, 2008).
One of the most controversial hypotheses
associated with anomalous experiences is
the psi hypothesis, which states that anoma-
lous experiences sometimes imply forms
of interactions falling outside currently
known biological and physical mecha-
nisms (Bem and Honorton, 1994). Thus,
far, small but persistent effects are fre-
quently reported in experiments testing
the psi hypothesis (Radin, 2006), while
no consensus has been reached concerning
their explanation (Alcock et al., 2003).
Research testing the psi hypothesis
has occasionally generated a great deal
of interest and controversy. The most
recent example is Bem’s series of precog-
nition experiments (Bem, 2011), which
triggered important methodological ques-
tionings on the validity of the frequen-
tist approach (Miller, 2011; Rouder and
Morey, 2011; Wagenmakers et al., 2011),
widely used in experimental sciences.
Bem’s paper was followed by an attempt
of replication (Ritchie et al., 2012a), which
resulted in reflections on the difficulty in
publishing direct replications in psychol-
ogy (Ritchie et al., 2012b). This debate,
still ongoing, has shown how research
about anomalous experiences can stim-
ulate cutting-edge discussions on scien-
tific methodology. This heuristic value
of anomalous experiences has a history
even in the infancy of cognitive neuro-
science with the German neurologist Hans
Berger, inventor of electroencephalogra-
phy and the first person to describe differ-
ent brain waves, having previously had a
telepathic experience with his sister which
made him obsessed by the idea of how
his mind could have carried such a signal
(Berger, 1940).
More recently, attempts to test the psi
hypothesis and find its neural correlates
have been carried out using functional
neuroimaging. The rationale behind these
experiments is that if psi-related processes
are indeed present in the brain, even
unconsciously, they should be observable
using functional neuroimaging. An exam-
ple of such a study would be to test
whether the brain activity of Participant
A would be influenced when Participant
B, situated in another isolated room,
intends to send information to or sim-
ply concentrate on Participant A. Various
types of hypothetical phenomena have
already been examined, including forms of
telepathy (Standish et al., 2003; Richards
et al., 2005; Moulton and Kosslyn, 2008;
Venkatasubramanian et al., 2008), distant
intentionality (Achterberg et al., 2005),
and precognition (Bierman and Scholte,
2002; Moulton and Kosslyn, 2008). All
these six studies but one (Moulton and
Kosslyn, 2008) reported results consistent
with the psi hypothesis.
Unfortunately, several of these stud-
ies suffer from methodological weaknesses
that could account for the reported effects.
Listing these flaws may contribute to the
improvement of the research in this field.
These methodological weaknesses can be
grouped into four categories:
1. Counter-balancing across participants
is routinely used in experimental psy-
chology and cognitive sciences to avoid
systematic biases due to experimental
conditions specific to one or several
participants. In Venkatasubramanian
et al. (2008), the receiver and the sender
were presented green and red-colored
stars to indicate the onset of telepa-
thy and control trials, respectively.
It is therefore not possible to know
whether the difference in brain activ-
ity between the two conditions is due
to the nature of the trial (telepathy vs.
control) or to the difference in the color
of the stimulus indicating trial onset.
To disentangle this potential confound,
the reverse cue association has to be
given for half of the trials—or half
of the participants, if their number is
sufficient.
2. Trial order randomization prevents
biases that could be caused by the par-
ticular order of the trial conditions.
Such biases can be caused by partici-
pants detecting a certain pattern (e.g.,
repetitions or alternations), leading to
expectations and thus detectable neural
signatures that could bias the results.
Habituation, leading to different brain
activity between the beginning and
the end of the experiment may also
bias the results. To counter-balance the
potential biases produced by a particu-
lar sequence—even if it was generated
randomly—each participant should be
given a distinct series of randomly-
ordered trials. Unfortunately, proper
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randomization was not met in four of
the six studies: In Venkatasubramanian
et al. (2008) no randomization was
used at all, while in Standish et al.
(2003) and Richards et al. (2005) the
duration of the trials was random-
ized, but not their order. Moreover,
in the Venkatasubramanian study, the
target picture was freely chosen and
drawn with a pen by one investigator
used as the “sender.” A randomized
target selection from a prepared set
of images would have been prefer-
able. Humans are indeed inherently
biased in their attempts to generate
random targets (Brugger and Taylor,
2003). Besides, a randomization would
have prevented potential correlations
between the target imagined by the
“sender” and the guess of the “receiver”
due to their potential interaction or
common immediate past experience
before the experiment.
3. Information shielding: All normal
mechanisms have to be excluded
for correlations between the source
(e.g., a “sender” or healer) and the
participant’s brain activity to be con-
sidered as psi (see e.g., Alcock et al.,
2003). However, some reports showed
weaknesses on this crucial point. In
Achterberg et al. (2005), the healer’s
task is to influence from a distance the
participant lying inside the scanner. In
this study, the same healer was used
for three different participants while
the same sequence (i.e., the order of
control and active sessions) was used.
Consequently, this particular healer
knew in advance this sequence, and it is
not specified whether contact between
the healer and the participants was
prevented. In the Venkatasubramanian
et al. (2008) study, the authors used
the same target image for the only two
participants whilst no information con-
cerning a possible interaction between
them was provided, potentially leading
to the same problem.
4. Small sample size, i.e., too small a num-
ber of participants and/or trials per par-
ticipant, was also a weakness of several
studies (Standish et al., 2003; Richards
et al., 2005; Venkatasubramanian et al.,
2008). As underpowered studies most
often miss existing effects (leading
to false negatives), reported positive
results have a low probability to reflect
a true effect (see e.g., Button et al.,
2013). Furthermore, with too few par-
ticipants, proper counter-balancing is
difficult and the risk of confounds is
greater.
Two studies (Bierman and Scholte, 2002;
Moulton and Kosslyn, 2008), however,
appear methodologically sound. Both
explored various potential sources of arti-
facts that could account for their respective
significant results. Bierman and Scholte
(2002) could not find any classical expla-
nation for the significant effects observed.
Moulton and Kosslyn (2008), on the other
hand, concluded that their results consti-
tuted “the strongest evidence yet obtained
against the existence of (psi)” despite
the logical difficulties in proving a neg-
ative existential proposition (Whitehead
and Russell, 1910–1913). Additionally,
despite the many precautions taken by
the experimenters, a subtle bias was still
found in one participant’s data, indicat-
ing that the design could potentially be
flawed.
Finally, none of the studies addressed
the issue of the confined and noisy envi-
ronment inside the scanner tube that
tends to make participants uncomfort-
able. As this problem is currently unavoid-
able, the participants could be prompted
about their comfort or relaxation level and
their answers used as a covariate in the
analysis.
Testing the psi hypothesis using neu-
roimaging is an important topic as it
may help to shed some light on the
nature of anomalous experiences (Watt
and Irwin, 2010; Krippner and Friedman,
2010b), on altered states of consciousness
(Krippner and Friedman, 2010a; Cardeña
and Winkelman, 2011) and more gen-
erally on potential methodological prob-
lems in the field of psychology and
neurosciences (Watt, 2005). Nevertheless,
in our opinion, no firm conclusions
concerning the psi hypothesis can be
made on the basis of this corpus of
functional neuroimaging data, and more
methodologically sound results need to be
generated.
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